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Abstract
It is usually thought that network externalities, which are inherent to liquidity, make it
desirable to concentrate transactions in one stock exchange. This paper shows that when the
value of liquidity stems from the ability of potentially reach as many traders as possible, the
market is integrated when every broker meets every other broker in at least one exchange. Thus,
fragmentation is not about trades being executed in di¤erent exchanges but of connectedness
among brokers.
An implication of this distinction is that in an integrated market the network externality
created by liquidity becomes pecuniary and the optimal number of exchanges depends only
on the shape of the (physical) technology to execute trades—whether it exhibits increasing,
constant or decreasing returns to scale—as in any standard industry.
We characterize the planner’s allocation and compare it with that reached by a monopoly.
It is shown that when exchanges are natural monopolies a particular ownership structure of the
exchange and allocation of voting rights over the exchange fee achieve the planner’s optimum.
With decreasing returns to scale the Walrasian allocation is e¢cient, provided that the
market is integrated. Nevertheless, with few exchanges the price-taking assumption is suspect. If
exchanges are not price takers, there are many other equilibria, all of them ine¢cient. Moreover,
there are reasons to doubt that the market will become integrated. Fragmentation softens price
competition between exchanges and may help a monopolist exchange to erect a barrier to entry
even when he has no cost advantage.
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It is usually thought that network externalities, which are inherent to liquidity, make it desirable to
concentrate transactions in one stock exchange.1 But, on the other hand, concentration may hurt
competition. Thus some fragmentation of trades in more than one exchange may be a price worth
paying to foster competition. What is the adequate balance of this trade o¤? This paper shows
that, in fact, a trade o¤ is not necessary.
It may seem that network externalities imply that all transactions should be centralized in
one exchange to take full advantage of it. Nevertheless, we start from the observation that the value
of liquidity stems from the ability of potentially reach as many traders as possible. Thus, if every
broker meets every other broker in at least one exchange, thereby giving complete reachability to
any pair of potential traders, then the market is integrated regardless of the number of exchanges
where transactions take place. Hence, fragmentation is not about trades being executed in di¤erent
exchanges but of connectedness among brokers. This distinction turns out to have a somewhat
surprising implication: in an integrated market the network externality created by liquidity becomes
pecuniary and the IO of the industry is “simple”: the optimal number of exchanges depends only on
the shape of the (physical) technology to execute trades—whether it exhibits increasing, constant
or decreasing returns to scale—as in any standard industry.
To study the IO of stock exchanges we present a model where a large number of investors, half
of them buyers and half of them sellers, want to trade at most one unit of an asset. By assumption
investors can trade only through a broker. In turn, to execute an order to buy or sell the security
brokers must meet pairwise in an exchange where both are members. Brokers are heterogeneous
but competitive and have standard, decreasing-returns-to-scale cost functions; exchanges are few
in number and have a standard cost function which allows to distinguish the cases of decreasing,
constant and increasing returns to scale in volume traded. Thus, we distinguish between brokerage
and exchange services, the two vertically-related activities that are needed in …xed proportions to
produce a trade2. By “brokerage” we mean services typically provided by brokers to investors, like
looking for a seller or buyer, executing a trade, back o¢ce activities, research, advice, or custody.
By “exchange services” we mean those services that stock exchanges provide to brokers, mainly
procedures and protocols that reduce the cost of …nding a seller or buyer. The price that investors
pay for executing a transaction is the sum of a brokerage commission and an exchange fee.
A key feature of the model is that we explicitly consider the role of liquidity. The utility of an
investor who posts a sell order with broker b increases with the number of buy orders handled by
1For example, The Economist recently stated that “[...] liquidity comes with size, one of the reasons why stock
exchanges are often described as natural monopolies.” (See “The hunt for liquidity”, July 28th, 2001).
2This is usually mandated by law. For example, in Chile brokers must execute all trades in an exchange.
2brokers who can be reached by b in at least one exchange (and conversely for a buyer-investor). It
follows that investors create network externalities: when a buyer-investor posts an order it reduces
trading costs of at least some sellers. When every broker is connected to every other broker through
at least one exchange all brokers o¤er exactly the same liquidity, and we say that the market is
integrated.
Fragmentation in this sense is the lack of integration or connectedness, and not merely the
fact that traded volume is split into many exchanges to handle it, as is the general meaning of the
term in the literature (see, for example, Lo [1996]).
As a benchmark, we characterize the solution to the planner’s problem. We show that the
social planner always integrates the market and allows free entry. Then, the optimal number of
exchanges and the optimal exchange fee are determined exclusively by the technology to execute
trades. Hence, if there are increasing returns to scale in the technology to execute trades then
exchanges are a natural monopoly. As in the standard case of any monopoly, the optimal number
of exchanges is one, and the optimal exchange fee (subject to the standard self-…nancing constraint)
equals the average cost of the exchange. On the other hand, if the technology to execute trades
exhibits decreasing returns to scale, then it is optimal to spread trades in many exchanges and set
the exchange fee equal to marginal cost. Thus, as in the textbook case, an exchange is a natural
monopoly only if its technology exhibits increasing returns to scale—liquidity does not have any
consequence. It is for this reason that one can call the IO of stock exchanges “simple”.
How can it be that the market is integrated when trades are spread in many exchanges? The
key point is that liquidity is in fact an attribute of brokers, not of exchanges. If broker b meets
pairwise with all other brokers in at least one exchange, then any sell order taken by broker b can
be matched by any other broker with a buy order, and the transaction can be executed in some
exchange. Thus, all brokers o¤er the market liquidity, regardless of the identity of the exchange
where a particular transaction is executed. It is also noteworthy that in an integrated market the
network externality created by investors is of the pecuniary kind. We show that in the optimum
the volume of transactions matches the cost of transacting with its value—liquidity included—in
the margin.
Next we analyze pricing when exchange services are monopolized. We show that the equi-
librium fee will crucially depend on the exchange’s ownership structure. A monopolistic exchange
owned by shareholders who are not brokers (call it independent monopoly) will exploit both its
monopoly power over investors and its monopsony power over brokers, but will allow free entry
into brokerage. By contrast, when brokers are shareholders and each owns one share (call this a
broker-owned exchange), all brokers who are active in equilibrium would like to set a lower fee than
3an independent monopoly3. The reason is that while all brokers participate in the exchange’s pro…t,
each also internalizes the negative e¤ect on brokerage pro…ts of a higher exchange fee. Nevertheless,
brokers di¤er in their preferred fee.
Thus, as has been pointed out by Hart and Moore (1996) and Pirrong (2000), there is a
con‡ict of interest between members, which is a central feature of broker-owned exchanges. It
occurs because the exchange fee plays two roles, exploitation of market power and, given the
one member-one share rule, redistribution of pro…ts from relatively e¢cient broker-members to
relatively less e¢cient ones. A broker who is more e¢cient than the average receives a smaller
share of exchange pro…ts than his contribution to them, and would like to set a low exchange fee,
in some cases even equal to the exchange’s average cost. At the other extreme, those who are
less e¢cient than the average would like to set a higher exchange fee because by so doing they
redistribute pro…ts to them. The extreme case of an “ine¢cient” broker is a shareholder that
chooses not to become an active broker which, not surprisingly, would like to set the same fee as
the independent monopoly. We also show that irrespective of their relative e¢ciency, brokers would
vote unanimously to restrict entry.
Understanding the relation between ownership structure and pricing behavior leads to a
somewhat unexpected result: one can combine a particular ownership structure and distribution of
ownership rights such that the exchange fee set by the broker-owned monopoly equals average cost,
which is optimal subject to the self-…nancing constraint when exchanges are natural monopolies.
This structure and distribution of voting rights is as follows. First, the number of shares must
be large so that many shareholders choose not to become active brokers in equilibrium. Second,
only active brokers may vote to choose the exchange fee. A large number of shareholders, most of
them inactive, implies that almost all pro…ts generated by active brokers are redistributed to pure
shareholders. Thus, all active brokers would like to set the exchange fee as low as possible—i.e.
the exchange fee will be equal to average cost if only active brokers can vote to set it.
Recent developments suggest the possibility that the same security may be traded in several
exchanges, each controlled by di¤erent owners. It is therefore appropriate to inquire whether
competition between exchanges leads to e¢cient outcomes.
The answer to this question is subtle. It is shown that Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is e¢cient,
provided the market is integrated. However, the existence of a small number of exchanges casts
doubts over the price-taking assumption. If exchanges are not price-takers, we …nd that there are
many other equilibria besides the WE, all of them ine¢cient.
Most importantly, there are reasons to doubt that the market will be integrated. Even
though brokers have an incentive to participate in as many exchanges as there are, in order to o¤er
3We allow for shareholders that choose not to become active brokers in equilibrium.
4higher liquidity to their clients, exchanges’ incentives point in the opposite direction. Fragmen-
tation softens price competition, possibly to the point of allowing to maintain higher pro…t levels
than would result in an integrated market. Similarly, a monopolist may use restrictions to cross
memberships to convert liquidity into a barrier to entry.
The literature on network externalities is vast (see, for example, Shy [2001]). Although our
modeling is similar to the standard one, this literature has touched on liquidity only few times.
Economides and Siow (1988), for instance, …nd in liquidity a network externality for a speci…c rea-
son: risk averse traders prefer to trade where others do because larger markets produce lower price
variances. They focus, however, on the equilibrium level of variety rather than in the organization
of the markets for trading. Pagano (1989) studies a coordination game between traders who have to
choose where to trade. Since liquidity depends on the entry decisions of all potential participants,
each trader assesses them according to conjectures about entry by others. If trade is equally costly
across markets, the network externality leads to the concentration of trade on one market. If not,
it can produce multiple conjectural equilibria, some where trade concentrates on one market and
others where large traders resort to a separate market or to search for a trading partner. In his
model fragmentation is welfare-reducing in the two-market case, but no such ranking is possible if it
involves o¤-exchange search. By contrast, in our model fragmentation is always welfare decreasing.
Di Noia (2001), on the other hand, studies competition among exchanges in the listing of
…rms’ securities. The externalities refer to the value of listing several securities in the same
exchange. Even considering that we restrict attention to a unique asset, the ‡avor of some of his
results are present also in this paper. Particularly, the optimality of integration —implicit merger
in his context—. Similarly, Foucault and Parlour (1999) study exchange competition for listings,
yet deprived of network externalities. By contrast, we study the trading side of exchanges and the
interaction between brokerage and the services provided by exchanges in a model with only one
security. In our model network externalities emerge because investors’ utility is increasing in the
number of orders in the market.
Pirrong (1999) also analyzes the organization of …nancial exchanges, characterizing the en-
dogenous determination of active exchanges and membership. In the one-asset case, he concludes
that the exchange is a natural monopoly, and that membership is strategically restricted to an in-
e¢cient level. He also investigates competition among exchanges when there are many assets. Our
paper departs from his in many respects. The most important di¤erence is that Pirrong’s notion
of liquidity is price stabilization, performed by heterogeneous, risk-averse market makers, and as
such involves no network externality –the market is automatically integrated. Hence, there are no
spreads or costs to brokerage: pro…ts are implicit in the expected price changes. By contrast, the
network externality is central in our analysis.
Our paper is also related to Hart and Moore (1996), who studied pricing by cooperative
5exchanges with heterogeneous members. In their model, pricing is decided by majority voting.
The median-voter theorem implies that the exchange will choose a high price if the distribution
of broker sizes is skewed towards high-cost brokers, but low prices will result if the distribution is
skewed towards low-cost brokers. We show how this con‡ict of interest can be exploited to make a
monopoly exchange price exchange services at average cost—the social optimum if exchanges are
natural monopolies.
Pirrong (2000) studied how the con‡ict of interest between heterogeneous brokers a¤ects
the choice between a for-pro…t and not-for-pro…t exchange. He shows that high-cost brokers may
accept to …x low exchange fees if relatively e¢cient brokers can credibly threaten to form a sepa-
rate exchange. In his model, high-cost brokers accept low exchange fees because having only one
exchange enables brokers to …x rules that facilitate collusion and all brokers earn rents. We go
beyond Pirrong’s by explicitly modeling the role of liquidity. Doing so enables us to show that
competition does not necessarily lead to e¢ciency, because exchanges can use prohibitions of mul-
tiple memberships to fragment the market and soften competition. Liquidity also enables us to
give a foundation for an exchange’s market power, a fact which has been pointed out by Pirrong
(2000). While liquidity may be used to create a barrier to entry, we suggest that by itself it is
not su¢cient—the exchange must combine it with restrictions to brokers to become members of
multiple exchanges. Liquidity is not a barrier to entry in an integrated market.
Finally, Santos and Scheinkman (2001) analyze whether competition among exchanges leads
them to set lower guarantee against traders’ defaults. By contrast, we assume that brokers never
default and concentrate in the determination of the fees that investors pay to trade.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we set up the model and study the
determinants of liquidity. Section 3 solves the planner’s problem. Section 4 studies the case of a
monopolistic exchange. Section 5 studies competition among exchanges. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
We study a secondary market with three types of agent: investors, brokers and exchanges. Each
investor buys or sells one unit of a single security. Brokers execute investor’s orders in an exchange
and charge brokerage commissions for it. Exchanges provide transaction services to brokers and
charge fees for them.4
4See Banner (1998) for an account of the services provided by exchanges.
62.1. Agents: preferences and technology
Investors There is a continuum of investors of mass 2, indexed by µ 2 [¡1;1]. A type µ investor
for whom µ ¸ 0 is a would-be buyer of the security, and her utility function is given by
ubu(µ;`se;pbu) ´
(
µ + ¿`se ¡ pbu if she buys
0 otherwise
(2.1)
Hence, µ is not only an index but also a taste parameter that determines the investor’s valuation.
Her valuation is also a¤ected by `se; the mass of the population of sellers with whom the buyer
can potentially trade—an indicator of the liquidity of the market. `se 2 [0;1]since the mass of all
potential sellers equals 1. ¿ ¸ 0 parametrizes the intensity of the preference for liquidity, and pbu is
the price of the security paid by the buyer, including any brokerage commissions and fees for using
the exchange.
The utility function (2.1) says that buyer µ will buy one unit of the security only if µ+¿`se ¸
pbu, that is, when the price inclusive of commissions and fees is at most equal to the utility of
having the security. Note that the more “liquid” the market, the higher is the buyer’s willingness
to pay for the security. That is, we assume that bringing together a large mass of buyers and sellers
creates wealth, presumably because it reduces (unmodelled) transaction costs.




pse + ¿`bu + µ if he sells
0 otherwise
(2.2)
where µ » U[¡1;0], `bu is the mass of the population of buyers with whom the seller can potentially
trade (`bu 2 [0;1]since the mass of all buyers equals 1) and pse is the price received by the seller
net of commissions and fees. It will be useful to assume ¿ 2 [0;1); as will be seen below, ¿ ¸ 1
would imply that sellers may be willing to pay for selling their security.
The inclusion of liquidity in trader’s utility function deserves some comments. Liquidity in
this model is a market attribute which traders attach value to. The (unmodelled) reasons for that
are the associations between trading volume and cost of providing immediacy, as documented in
Grossman and Miller (1988), and between expected time to sell an asset and number of quotes
received, as in Lippman and McCall (1986). Uncertainty and time are two dimensions at the
heart of the very concept of liquidity; yet, including them explicitly in a model of the industrial
organization of exchange services was deemed unnecessary. As O’Hara (1995) puts it, “liquidity is
not so easily de…ned as it is recognized.” The notion that will be kept in the background is that
larger markets are more liquid, and that liquidity is a valuable attribute to traders either because
7it reduces search costs or because it improves bargaining positions. While liquidity is in essence
a dynamic phenomenon, in this paper we follow Santos and Scheinkman (2001) and concentrate
in one aspect of it, namely that ceteris paribus, investors prefer to trade in a market with higher
volume.
Brokers There is a continuum of possibly heterogenous and perfectly competitive brokers of mass
B 2 IR++. If broker b 2 [0;B] executes x transactions, he incurs in total brokerage costs (excluding
any fees charged by the exchange fees) of
®bx + 1
2¯bx2 + ´;
with ®b ¸ 0, ¯b > 0. This cost function re‡ects diminishing returns to scale in brokerage services.
We assume that both, ®b and ¯b, are non-decreasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable
functions of b in [0;B]. This implies that for all b; b0 2 [0;B] such that b · b0, broker b can
intermediate a given volume x at least as cheaply as broker b0. We also assume that there is a …xed
cost ´ ¸ 0 to become an active broker.
All brokers are required to be members of at least one exchange in order to process any
transaction. Those a¢liated brokers we call “active.” We denote by B the set of all active brokers.
Exchanges There are E 2 IN identical exchanges of positive mass, indexed by e 2 f1;2;:::;Eg.
If an exchange executes a mass y of trades, it incurs a total cost of
°y + 1
2±y2 + ¹;
where ¹ is the sunk cost of establishing an exchange, and ° > 0. To simplify the exposition, in
what follows we will consider two particular cases:
² ± = 0 and ¹ > 0. That is, the trading technology exhibits constant marginal cost but …xed
costs, hence returns to scale are increasing.
² ± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0. That is, there are non-increasing returns to exchange services.
E µ f1;2;:::;Eg is the set of active exchanges (i.e. those that have paid the entry cost ¹)
and E · E is the number of active exchanges.
It may be argued that in practice large …xed costs necessarily make exchanges a natural
monopoly. Nevertheless, Cybo Ottone et al. (2002) argue that, while exchange scale economies
are very di¢cult to measure, they do not seem to be very important.5 We choose to be agnostic
5See also Malkamaki (1999).
8on the issue and analyze the implications of increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale in
exchange services.
Trading procedures and rules To buy or sell a security, investors must place an order with an
active broker. In turn, brokers must execute all orders through an exchange, even when the same
broker stands at both sides of the transaction.6 Thus, to complete a transaction each side must use
one unit of brokerage services and one unit of exchange services, a …xed–proportions technology.
For simplicity we assume that only executed trades generate costs to brokers and exchanges. That
is, posting an order is costless, but executing a transaction is not.
To post orders in exchange e a broker must be member of it. We denote broker b’s membership
in exchange e by b 2 Be, where Be is the set of brokers who are members of exchange e. Similarly,
we let Eb be the set of exchanges where broker b is a member. Since exchange services are necessary
to make a trade, broker b can trade with broker b0 if and only if they meet at some exchange, that
is, b; b0 2 Be for at least one exchange e, or equivalently if Eb \ Eb0 6= Á. Henceforth we will call
broker b “single” if she is member of only one exchange (i.e. Eb is a singleton) and “dual” if she is
member of two exchanges. Note that [e2EBe = B.
2.2. Liquidity and market integration
In our model liquidity a¤ects the willingness to trade of buyers and sellers. In this subsection we
discuss liquidity and de…ne “integrated” and “fragmented” markets in connection to it. Moreover,
we obtain su¢cient conditions for a market to be integrated. We begin by making explicit what
we mean by an ‘allocation’ in this context.
De…nition 1. An allocation is a correspondence
E : [0;B] ! 2f1;:::;Eg
: b ! Eb
indicating brokers’ a¢liations, and a function
X : [¡1;1] £ [0;B] £ E ! f0;1g
: µ;b;e ! x(µ;b;e)
that assigns where x(µ;b;e) = 1 if investor µ (buyer if µ > 0, seller otherwise) trades with broker b,
and the trade is executed in exchange e 2 Eb, 0 otherwise.
6In many countries there are strict regulations that force brokers to follow this procedure, presumably to protect
small investors from fraud.
9Remark 1. Note that we allow brokers to be members of more than one exchange. This is the
case, for example, in Chile.
The fact that trades must be settled in an exchange implies that the volume of buyers and
sellers must coincide in each exchange. Therefore, we can restrict attention to allocations such that











De…nition 2 (Feasible allocations). An allocation (E,X) is feasible if it satis…es condition (2.3).
Now given that broker b belongs to all exchanges in Eb, he can reach all brokers in those




















buy orders. Let us refer to these numbers (`se
b ;`bu
b ) as the liquidities that broker b o¤ers. They mean
the following: broker b can o¤er liquidity `se
b to a buyer of the security and liquidity `bu
b to a seller
of the security. Note that the sum is over all exchanges (E), not only those of which b is a member.
What matters for liquidity is the total number of orders executed by brokers that b can reach (i.e.
brokers that are in Bb). It does not matter whether or not those orders are executed in exchanges
where b is a member. Note, moreover, that broker b does not bene…t from the liquidity created
by brokers who are only members of exchanges where b is not a member (i.e., trades executed by
brokers b0 such that Eb \ Eb0 = ;).
















where the equality follows from condition (2.3). This occurs when the broker meets almost every
broker in at least one exchange. We are now ready to de…ne an integrated market:
De…nition 3. A market is integrated if `su
b = `bu
b = ` a.e. in B. A market is fragmented otherwise.
10In a sense, this is to require that (almost) all brokers o¤er an homogeneous service. Discon-
nected networks of brokers would produce market segmentation, where each net can only o¤er a
fraction of the total liquidity available in the economy. By contrast, if all networks are connected,
everybody enjoys the maximum liquidity available. An integrated market is such that every poten-
tial investor is reachable from (almost) any broker, that is, almost any broker meets every other
would-be counterpart’s broker at some exchange.
Proposition 1 (Su¢cient conditions for integration). A market is integrated if any of the
following is satis…ed:
(i) 9e¤ 2 f1;:::;Egsuch that Be¤ = B.
(ii) Eb \ Eb0 6= ; pairwise a.e. in B.
















x(µ;b0;e)dµdb0 = ` = `bu
b
for almost all b, where the last equality follows from condition (2.3). This proves the …rst part.
Part (ii) follows similarly after noting that (ii) implies that [e2EbBe ´ Bb = B.
Remark 2. (i) and (ii) are actually equivalent with two exchanges (E = 2). With E > 3, (i) implies
(ii), but (ii) does not imply (i). The reason is that with two exchanges, there is only one other
exchange to meet if they don’t meet in one of them.
Remark 3. These conditions are not necessary. On the one hand, it is clear that (i) is stronger
than (ii) in general. On the other hand, there might be some allocations where reaching a certain
subset of brokers is not necessary because they don’t give access to any counterparts for a trade.
However, for generic allocations, (ii) is also a necessary condition.
The previous discussion highlights the fact that it is brokers who o¤er liquidity to investors,
not exchanges. Brokers gain access to counterparts for a trade by meeting other brokers, either in
one exchange or in many. Nevertheless, brokers who are members of the same exchange may di¤er
in the amount of liquidity they are able to o¤er to their clients when the market is not integrated,
as the following example shows.
Example 1. Let broker b¤ be member of exchange e¤ only; let b be member of all e 2 E; …nally,










¡1 x(µ;b0;e)dµdb0. Then Bb¤ = Be¤ and




















broker b, in turn, o¤ers liquidities `se
b = `bu
b = `, since Bb = B. Moreover, `se
b = `bu
b = ` >
maxf`se
b¤;`bu
b¤g since Be¤ 6= B. But both brokers are members of exchange e¤.
It is apparent from the example that liquidity is not an attribute of the exchange. For
instance, from the point of view of a seller, the liquidity of a trade in exchange eis less when
executed by b¤ than when it is executed by b.
We can de…ne an indicator of average or market liquidity and market integration:
De…nition 4 (Market liquidity and integration). Let B be the mass of active brokers. We













and analogously for `bu and Ibu. Note that when the market is integrated, market liquidity equals
` and integration 1. Hence, integration refers to connectedness, whereas liquidity to market size.
For future reference, it is useful to derive a demand for transactions in an integrated market.
A potential buyer would trade only if µ + ¿`se ¡ pbu ¸ 0, that is, µ ¸ pbu ¡ ¿`se: Hence, a
fraction
R 1
pbu¡¿`se dµ = 1 ¡ pbu + ¿`se of potential buyers will trade at price pbu and liquidity `se:
Similarly, a seller will trade if pse + ¿`bu + µ ¸ 0; thus, at price pse and liquidity `bu, a fraction
R 0
¡(pse+¿`bu) dµ = pse + ¿`bu will sell. But since the market is integrated, `se = `bu = ` and
` = 1 ¡ pbu + ¿`, which implies that pbu = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)`: Moreover, since `se ´ pse + ¿`bu and
` = pse +¿`, it follows that pse = `(1 ¡ ¿); so that for any given liquidity level
pbu ¡ pse = 1 ¡ `(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ `(1 ¡ ¿)
= 1 ¡ 2`(1 ¡ ¿);
12which gives the demand for transacting. In contrast, if the market is not integrated, the willingness
to pay for transactions will not depend on the total volume of trade, but on the fractions being
o¤ered on each segment.
3. The social optimum
We begin by studying the problem of a welfare-maximizing planner. We assume that the planner
can choose the number of exchanges, E and the exchange fee per transaction, pE. The brokerage
market is perfectly competitive and there is free entry, so that the social planner cannot directly
choose the mass of active brokers, the allocation of brokers across exchanges and the allocation
of trades across brokers and exchanges; it can only choose a price, pE, which is taken as given by
brokers and investors.
It is useful to start by showing that the planner always integrates the market. After that we
characterize the competitive equilibrium of brokerage when the market is integrated, taking the
choices of the planner as parameters. Last, we formulate and solve the planner’s problem.
3.1. Some preliminary results
We begin by showing a fundamental result.
Proposition 2 (Integration Pareto-dominates fragmentation). For any given number of ex-
changes E and measure of brokers B, any allocation (E,X) such that I < 1 is Pareto dominated by
another allocation (E
0
,X) such that I = 1.
Proof. If E = 1 then the market is trivially integrated. Suppose now that E > 1 and that
allocation (E,X) is optimal. Since I < 1, it follows that `se
b < ` for a positive measure of brokers
b 2 B0 ½ B. Now suppose that brokers reallocate and become members of all exchanges, so that
the market becomes integrated and I = 1. Then all transactions that were formerly made can still
be made in the same exchanges. Moreover, becoming a member of an exchange does not use up
resources. Thus, even if exactly the same trades are done, a positive measure of the buyers will
have now higher utility µ + ¿` > µ + ¿`se
b , and social welfare will be higher. A similar argument
shows that any allocation of buyers such that I < 1 cannot be optimal. Hence, fragmentation is
Pareto-inferior to integration.
The proof of Proposition2 only uses the fact that liquidity is valuable. It depends neither
on the cost structure of brokers (the proof works without changing the pattern of trades that were
done before integration), nor the number of exchanges, nor the cost structure of exchanges. This
implies that in the (unconstrained) social optimum `b = ` for all brokers b no matter how many
13exchanges there are. Hence, all brokers o¤er exactly the same liquidity and the optimal number
of exchanges is determined solely by the technology to execute trades, as the following proposition
shows.
Proposition 3. Fix the number of brokers B. (i) If ± = 0 and ¹ > 0 (i.e. the technology to
execute trades exhibits increasing returns to scale) then having one exchange is socially optimal.
(ii) If ± > 0 and ¹ = 0 (i.e. the technology to execute trades exhibits decreasing returns to scale)
then it is optimal to have E exchanges and spread volume equally across exchanges.
Proof. (i) Let ± = 0 and ¹ > 0 and suppose that E > 1. Then Proposition 2 implies that any
allocation (E,X) such that I < 1 is Pareto dominated by another allocation (E
0
,X) such that I = 1.
Now, choose an allocation (1,X
0
) (where 1 denotes that only exchange 1 is active) and all brokers
do exactly the same trades but all in exchange 1. Then I = 1, total brokerage costs are exactly
the same, and total …xed exchange costs are reduced.
(ii) Let ± > 0 and ¹ = 0, suppose that E = 1 and consider an allocation (1,X). Clearly
I = 1. Now choose allocation (E,X
0
) which di¤ers from (1,X)in that all brokers are members of
all exchanges, all brokers execute the same trades in such a way that volume in each exchange
equals `
E. Then total brokerage costs are exactly the same, still I = 1; and total exchange costs
are reduced since trading costs are convex in volume.
Corollary 1. For any given number of exchanges E, a su¢cient condition to minimize execution
costs is that volume ` is equally spread across exchanges.
Proof. It follows directly from exchanges’ costs being convex in `.
Integration is not su¢cient to allow the planner to spread trades equally across all exchanges,
however, as shown by the trivial case when all brokers are members of only one and the same
exchange. Hence, cost minimization requires that brokers are members of a su¢cient number of
exchanges; trivially, this is satis…ed when each broker is member of all exchanges, but weaker
membership requirements may also do. For simplicity, we will assume in what follows that each
broker is member of each exchange. Last, recall that in an integrated market, we can use the inverse
demand for transactions, pbu ¡ pse = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)2`, which we derived in the previous section.
3.2. The competitive equilibrium in brokerage
We now characterize the competitive equilibrium in the brokerage market. Suppose that the planner
chooses E ¸ 1 exchanges and an exchange fee pE. Then, we de…ne a competitive equilibrium in the
brokerage market as follows:
14De…nition 5. A competitive equilibrium of brokerage services with free entry in an integrated
market is a price of brokerage services pB, a vector of executed trades [(x¤
b)B
0 ;`], a pair of asset
prices (pbu;pse)and a feasible allocation (E,X) such that, givenE and pE:
(i) x¤








b)2 ¸ ´ for all b 2 [0;B], with equality for B;










(v) pbu = pse +2(pB + pE):
(i) and (ii) state that brokers maximize pro…ts in equilibrium; (iii) states the same for investors. (iv)
says that in equilibrium the volume of buy orders equals the volume of sell orders; moreover, that
number must coincide with the volume intermediated by brokers. The requirement that volumes
sold and bought in each exchange must be the same is implicit in the fact that the allocation (E,X)
is feasible.
The following lemma establishes su¢cient conditions that characterize an equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Let a competitive equilibrium of brokerage services exist. Then the following conditions
are su¢cient for p¤
B and [(x¤
b)B
0 ;`] to be part of an equilibrium:







B)2 = ´ (3.2)






Proof. Condition (3.1) follows directly from the fact that brokers maximize bene…ts given the
equilibrium price. (3.2) is a standard zero-pro…t condition that must hold for the marginal entrant
B. Since x¤
B · x¤
b for all b in [0;B) (since ® and ¯ are nondecreasing in b), it immediately implies




b)2 ¸ ´ for all b 2 [0;B]. Next, we know from the previous section that
in an integrated market pbu ¡ pse = 1 ¡ 2`(1 ¡ ¿). From the de…nition of equilibrium, moreover,




pbu+¿` dµ = `, since
the demand for transactions 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)2` is derived from investor’s pro…t maximization. Last,
condition (3.4) trivially follows from (iv) in the de…nition of equilibrium.
15Note that pB, [(x¤
b)B
0 ;`] and B are di¤erentiable functions of pE, because the conditions of the
implicit function theorem are met by (3.1)–(3.4). This will considerably simplify the exposition
and analysis of the planner’s and monopoly problems. Last, the assumptions imply that there
exists a well-de…ned and upward sloping supply curve of brokerage services. Hence, if pE. is not
too high a competitive equilibrium in brokerage exists and is unique.
3.3. The planner’s problem
We are now ready to study the planner’s problem. In practice, exchanges set their fees and brokers
compete taking them as given. For this reason, we will study the problem of a planner that can
choose the exchange fee pE and takes the competitive brokerage market as given. Nevertheless, we
will also show that choosing pE is su¢cient to implement the allocation that the planner would
choose if it could dictate allocations directly.
As said before, we only consider two cases. In the …rst, ± = 0 and ¹ > 0: marginal costs
of trade execution are constant, but there is a …xed cost of establishing an exchange. Then it is
socially optimal to have only one exchange, which is a natural monopoly. The second case assumes
that ± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0: there are non-decreasing marginal costs, but no …xed costs of entry. In this
case the optimal number of exchanges is E > 1.7 Moreover, we know that the planner will choose
to integrate markets and, when E > 1, choose an allocation such that trades can be spread evenly
across exchanges.
Given that the planner will choose to integrate markets and volume will be equally spread























where E is either 1 or E. In other words, the planner wants to maximize the di¤erence between
investor surplus on the one hand, and the sum of brokerage and exchange costs on the other.
The planner’s maximization is subject to two di¤erent constraints. First, [(x¤
b)B
0 ;`)] and B
come from a competitive equilibrium in brokerage, and as such are functions of pE. Second, we will









` ¡ E¹ ¸ 0 (3.6)
that is, exchange fees collected from brokers in equilibrium must pay for all costs incurred by
7By ruling out cases with ±;¹ > 0 we avoid …nding the optimal integer number of exchanges, which is somewhat
cumbersome and adds little understanding about the issues we are interested in.
16exchanges. This self-…nancing constraint is standard in the economics of regulation and we introduce
it to compare the planner’s solution with the optimal solution in standard monopoly regulation.
The next proposition shows that it is optimal to price exchange services at marginal cost when
the technology to execute trades exhibits non-increasing returns to scale (± ¸ 0and ¹ = 0) and
set the exchange fee equal to average costs when exchanges exhibit increasing returns (± = 0and
¹ > 0).
Proposition 4. (i) If ± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0, then marginal cost pricing of exchange services is optimal.
(ii) If ± = 0 and ¹ > 0, then average cost pricing of the exchange is optimal.





































from which it follows that 2pE = ° satis…es the FOC. Moreover, we know that marginal cost pricing
with decreasing returns to scale covers all costs and results in a quasirent. Hence, marginal cost
pricing satis…es the self-…nancing constraint with slack.
(ii) When ± = 0 having just one exchange is optimal and marginal cost pricing would imply
2pE = °. Hence, it is optimal to charge the lowest exchange fee that covers the total cost, which is





At …rst sight Proposition 4 looks quite standard. Yet, it is somewhat surprising that either
marginal or average cost pricing of exchange services is optimal, despite the fact that there are
network externalities in trading—investors gain when more investors trade. Shouldn’t network
externalities make of exchanges, as is often claimed, natural monopolies? Moreover, isn’t entry
of brokers suboptimally low in the competitive brokerage equilibrium? In fact, it is shown in the
appendix that the optimal allocation we have obtained subject to the constraint that brokerage is
competitive, is the same that would be chosen by the planner if he could directly choose B, xb,
and `. In other words, a competitive equilibrium in brokerage with free entry plus the appropriate
exchange fee is su¢cient to decentralize the optimal allocation. Therefore:
17Result 3.1. Optimal pricing of exchange services depends only on the characteristics of the ex-
change’s technology. In an integrated market, liquidity is irrelevant to determine its industrial
organization: it does not make of exchanges natural monopolies.
3.4. Discussion: why does liquidity become irrelevant?
Why is liquidity irrelevant and where did the network externality go? The intuition behind Result
3.1 can be understood in two steps. First, when the market is integrated neither brokers nor
exchanges produce a network externality. To see this, suppose that ` is being traded and add
another broker or exchange. Liquidity will still be exactly `, because no matter in which exchange
or through which broker an investor decides to trade, it will access exactly the same liquidity. Thus,
the contribution of an additional broker or exchange is just to reduce the marginal cost of executing
a trade, as the same quantity is spread over more units. This is exactly the e¤ect of an additional
…rm in any competitive market. Second, an additional investor, say a seller, in fact directly increases
buyers’ utility thus producing an externality. Nevertheless, for a given equilibrium brokerage fee,
pB, the added liquidity increases the willingness to pay for the security. If the brokerage market is
competitive, this increase willingness to pay will be fully translated into the net price received by
the seller. Hence, at the margin the seller exactly internalizes the value of this external e¤ect and
the decision to sell is e¢cient—the externality is in fact pecuniary.
It is now clear why we call the industrial organization of stock exchanges “simple”: when
the market is integrated, optimal pricing of exchanges and brokerage services looks exactly as in
any other market. Competition leads to optimal brokerage commissions and optimal exchange fees
set by a planner follow exactly the same principles as in any standard market. Therefore, whether
stock exchanges are natural monopolies depends only on the shape of the technology to execute
trades, not on liquidity. As we will see in section 5, however, structure matters, because under
some circumstances liquidity can be used to establish a barrier to entry. Before that, we will study
pricing by a monopolistic exchange and compare it with the social optimum.
4. A monopolistic exchange
Until recently it was the norm that only one broker-owned exchange would exist. Indeed, many
countries granted a legal monopoly to one exchange. It also used to be the case that exchanges
had the right to …x commissions and in many countries it was illegal for a broker to undercut this
brokerage fee. Increasingly, brokerage fees are market–determined. But, as we show in this section,
exchanges can still exploit monopoly power through …xing pE and may want to restrict entry into
brokerage. In what follows we show that the ownership structure of the exchange a¤ects its pricing
and entry policies.
18We begin by studying the optimum of a pro…t maximizing monopoly which is integrated
with brokerage. Such structure is not found in practice, but is still provides a useful benchmark to
compare the two structures that we observe more frequently, namely, the exchange owned by an
outsider, and the brokers’ cooperative. Further, it will become apparent that the outside-owned
monopolistic exchange is a special case of the broker-owned exchange.
4.1. A vertically-integrated monopoly
We begin by showing that the monopolist is better o¤ integrating the market.
Lemma 2 (Monopolists integrate markets). For any given number of exchanges E and mea-
sure of brokers B, any allocation (E,X) such that I < 1 there exists another allocation (E
0
,X) such
that I = 1 and ¼M(E;X) · ¼M(E
0
;X), where ¼M is the monopolist pro…t.
Proof. If E = 1, the market is trivially integrated. Suppose now that E > 1 and that allocation
(E,X) is optimal. Since I < 1, it follows that `se
b < ` for a positive measure of brokers B0 ½ B.
If brokers reallocate and become members of all exchanges, the market becomes integrated
and I = 1. Then, all transactions that were formerly made can still be made in the same exchanges.
This, however, cannot be a competitive equilibrium in the brokerage market, because in equilibrium
investors are indi¤erent with which broker to trade. This implies that at the old set of prices,
brokers in B0 are more attractive than the rest and all buyers would like to trade with them. Hence,
…xing `, it follows that total brokerage costs can be reduced if brokers in B0 gain some volume,
and brokers in (B0)C loose some volume. Then (almost) all investors are better o¤. But then the
monopolist can increase pE and still ` will be traded. A similar argument shows that any allocation
of buyers such that I < 1 cannot be optimal. Hence, pro…ts for the monopolist are higher in an
integrated market.
It follows that a vertically-integrated monopolist chooses pE to maximize the di¤erence be-
tween, on the one hand, exchange and membership fees, and, on the other the cost of providing

































¡E¹ ¸ 0 (4.2)
(superscript “VI” denotes that this is a vertically-integrated monopoly). Assuming that the self-






















(xb)2 + ´ ¡ ¸xb = 0; (4.3)
where ¸ is the multiplier of constraint (4.1). We note in passing that, as with the social planner,
the optimal number of exchanges E depends only on the shape of the technology to execute trades.
The monopolist will operate E exchanges if returns are decreasing (± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0), and only one
exchange if there are scale economies (± = 0 and ¹ > 0).








+ 2`(1 ¡ ¿): (4.4)
° + ±`
E is the marginal cost of brokerage and 2`(1 ¡ ¿) is the monopolist’s markup. Thus,
condition (4.4) is quite familiar: the vertically integrated monopolist adds the standard markup
over the exchange’s marginal cost, which depends on the elasticity of the demand for trading.8 Note
also that, as condition (4.3) shows, the vertically integrated monopoly does not distort entry, even
though the number of brokers is less than with a social planner because the equilibrium volume `
is smaller.
8In an integrated market the elasticity of the demand for trading with respect to the exchange fee is ¡
pE
`(1¡¿) and
the mark-up at the optimum is
`(1¡¿)
pE .
204.2. An independent monopoly
It is currently debated whether stock exchanges should be “demutualized”, that is, owned by
shareholders who are not brokers at the same time. We now study the choices of an independent
monopolist who does not own brokerage. Since the proof of Lemma 2 also applies for an independent
















subject to the same self-…nancing constraint (4.2), where ` is determined in a competitive equilib-
rium of the brokerage market (superscript “I” denotes that this is an independent monopoly). If













which looks quite standard. At the margin, the monopolist trades o¤ the increase in revenue due
to a higher exchange fee with the fall due to reduced volume. Since d`
dpE < 0, it is apparent that
the monopolist wants to set the exchange fee above marginal cost.
Nevertheless, it is convenient to examine the FOC a bit more closely. To do so, note that




with ¢ ´ ¡f(1 ¡ ¿)[(x¤































(see Appendix C). As a benchmark, consider the case when all brokers are identical. Then C = 0
(the supply of brokerage services is perfectly elastic), d`









+ 2`(1 ¡ ¿)
which is exactly the same exchange fee that would be chosen by a vertically integrated monopolist.
21This is a standard result from the vertical control literature.9 Nevertheless, if C0 > 0 the supply
curve of brokerage services is upward sloping. Then the monopoly exchange is also a monopsony
in the market for exchange services. Thus, it …xes an exchange fee which is higher than the one
that a vertically integrated monopoly would choose, and the markup is higher the more inelastic
the brokerage supply curve.
Result 4.1. An independent monopolist exploits both monopoly and monopsony power optimally.
Therefore, for a given number of brokers, an independent monopoly distorts the market both
on the demand and the supply side. Would the monopolist gain by restricting entry to brokerage?
The answer is no, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5. An independent monopolist does not restrict entry into brokerage.
Proof. Assume that the monopolist restricts entry to B and then chooses pE optimally. Also,












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
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Thus, entry is less than what would be chosen by a social planner (BI < BP, where BP is the number
of brokers that optimally enters when the planner chooses pE), but only because the exchange fee
set by the monopolist is too high. The intuition is quite simple: entry by an additional broker
spreads the same volume among more brokers. Competition in brokerage reduces brokerage fees
and thus allows the monopolist to increase the exchange fee and pro…ts without a¤ecting volume.
Hence, it is in the monopolist’s interest to allow for unrestricted entry, but charge an exchange fee
that exploits both its monopoly and monopsony power. Also:
Corollary 2. With an independent monopoly, the value of an exchange seat is zero.
At the margin the last broker makes no quasirents, and thus the value of a seat is zero.
4.3. A broker-owned monopoly
Broker-owned exchanges are usually built on the “one member one share” rule and each receives
an equal share of the pro…ts made by the exchange. Nevertheless, entry and exchange fee policies
9This result dates back to Spengler (1950). See also Tirole (1988).
22will in general di¤er from those of an independent monopolist because broker-members’ pro…ts also
depend on their quasi rents as brokers. Moreover, we will see that cost di¤erences among brokers
introduce a con‡ict of interest among them. Thus, the objective of the exchange will depend on its
internal decision rule. This section con…rms formally the assertions formulated by Pirrong (1999)
in this respect. Of particular importance is the result that brokers heterogeneity determines the
behavior of the exchange.
To begin, we make the following simplifying assumption.




; that is, the original owners of the
exchange are the lowest cost brokers.
This e¢ciency assumption is not necessarily realistic, but it is generous in the sense that it endows
the exchange with no initial ine¢ciency; any ine¢ciency will be due to the distorted incentives that
drive a monopoly. Also, note that in a broker-owned exchange a necessary condition to be active as a
broker is to have one share. Nevertheless, shareholders may choose not to become active brokers. In
what follows we will use the terms “shareholders” and “broker-member” interchangeably. Brokers
who choose to execute trades and pay the entry cost ´ we will call “active”.















The …rst term is very similar to the objective function of the independent monopolist, except for
the fact that it is decreasing in the measure of members. The second term is the broker’s pro…t,






and 0 because the broker can always choose to remain inactive and save the …xed cost ´. We start
by characterizing pricing when the number of broker-members is large. Then we review the entry
policy of a broker-owned exchange. Last, we study pricing in an exchange with a small number of
broker-members.
Note that the exchange fee charged by a broker-owned monopoly and its entry policy will
be the result of an election. Majority voting is a possible procedure10, but there are other voting
rules that may be included in a charter. For example, the exchange’s charter may delegate the
decision to a board of directors, restrict the vote to shareholders that become active brokers in
equilibrium, and so on. Instead of sticking to one of these alternatives, we will study the optimal
fee and entry policy that would be chosen by each broker member. This will reveal the central
con‡ict of interest between broker-members, and enable us to show that a particular ownership
10See Hart and Moore (1996).
23structure and distribution of voting rights over the exchange fee can lead to average cost pricing of
exchange services.
4.3.1. Exchange fees with a large number of broker-members
So suppose that broker b could decide the exchange’s policy. Call pE(b) the exchange fee that
maximizes b’s pro…t (4.6) subject to the exchange’s self-…nancing constraint (4.2). We now state
two lemmas that will be useful to characterize the optimum that would be chosen by broker b. The
…rst characterizes pE(b) when the self-…nancing constraint is slack.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique b b > BI such that (i) for all b > b b, pE(b) = pI
E; (ii) for all b · b b,
pE(b) < pI
E;(iii) pE(b) is increasing in b for all b 2 [0;b b]:
Proof. In the Appendix.
Clearly, as Hart and Moore (1996) have pointed out, the exchange fee set by a broker-owned
monopoly depends on which shareholder is pivotal in the vote to set the fee —hence on the internal
voting procedure. But, in addition, the optimal fee from the point of view of broker-member b
also depends on B. In e¤ect, if B is large enough, the highest costs broker-members will choose to
remain inactive in equilibrium, and the market will behave as if there were free entry: while the
number of shareholders is …xed in B, the number of active brokers is endogenous. By contrast, if
B is small enough, then every broker-member will be active in equilibrium.
The following lemma makes precise what we mean by “large” and “small” B.
Lemma 4. (i) For all b there exists a number B(b), such that (i) if B > B(b), then brokers in
(B(b);B] remain inactive when pE = pE(b); (ii) if B · B(b) then all brokers are active when
pE = pE(b); (iii) B(b) is non-increasing in b; (iv) for b ¸b b, B(b) =b b.
Proof. In the Appendix.
We are now ready to study the case when B is large. If the self-…nancing constraint holds





















where we have used the derivatives which are found in Appendix A. It follows that when the number
of brokers is large, an active broker b · B(b) chooses an exchange fee which is lower than with an
independent monopolist. The reason is that the active broker internalizes in part the cost of a high
24exchange fee because it extracts part of his quasirent and redistributes it to other brokers. It is













where x ´ 2`
B is the average volume per member (not active broker). Note …rst that a broker who
optimally would set pE(b) so that x(b) = x¤
b(b) (henceforth call it “the average broker”) would set
the same exchange fee that a vertically integrated monopoly, pVI
E ; an low-cost broker (i.e. one that
would optimally set a fee pE(b) so that x¤
b(b) > x(b) in equilibrium) would like to set it below; and
a “small” broker (x¤
b(b) < x(b)), above.
Result 4.2. There is a con‡ict of interest between broker-members. The lower the broker’s cost,
the lower the exchange fee he would like to set.
The con‡ict of interest between members is a central feature of broker-owned exchanges.
It occurs because the exchange fee plays two roles, exploitation of market power and, given the
one member-one share rule, redistribution of pro…ts from relatively low-cost broker-members to
relatively high-cost ones. An average broker does not see this con‡ict, because her contribution to
exchange pro…ts exactly matches her share in the dividend. Therefore, at the margin she receives
back as pro…ts the additional dollar of exchange fees she generates. Given that the average broker
fully internalizes the cost of brokerage at the margin, she would like to set exactly the same fee as a
vertically integrated monopoly. By contrast, one with a lower–than-average-cost broker receives a
smaller share of exchange pro…ts than his contribution to them, and would like to set an exchange
fee lower than pVI
E . At the other extreme, those with higher costs than the average broker would
like to set the exchange fee higher than pVI
E to redistribute pro…ts. In the extreme, a member with
too high costs chooses to remain inactive, and would like to act as an independent monopoly and
set pI
E.
Now note that x is decreasing in B but does not a¤ect B(b). Hence, the more shareholders
there are, the more likely it is that an active broker will prefer to set the fee below pVI
E . More
importantly, when B is su¢ciently large, then all active brokers prefer that. Thus:
Result 4.3. If the measure of broker-members is large, and active brokers set the fee, then welfare
with a broker-owned monopoly is unambiguously higher than with a vertically-integrated monopoly.
It is now apparent that when B is very large, then all active brokers may want to set the exchange
fee as low as possible and the exchange’s self-…nancing constraint will bind. Therefore:
Result 4.4. If the number of broker members is su¢ciently large, then all active brokers would
like to set the exchange fee equal to average cost.
25When the mass of inactive members is su¢ciently large, there is no con‡ict of interest among active
brokers and they behave “e¢ciently”. The reason is that by then all active brokers contribute a
share to exchange pro…ts which is higher than what they get back as dividends and all want to
set the lowest possible exchange fee that is consistent with self-…nancing—i.e. average cost pricing.
By contrast, a member who chooses not to become active would like to act as an independent
monopoly. It follows that:
Result 4.5. If the exchange is a natural monopoly (± = 0and ¹ > 0) and B is su¢ciently large,
all active brokers would like to set the same fee as the social planner.
Of course, if the fee is chosen by majority voting and B is very large, then inactive broker-members
would vote to set the fee at pI
E. But Result 4.4 is shows that allocating voting rights over the
exchange fee only to active brokers but equal cash ‡ow rights to all shareholders yields the planner’s
allocation when the exchange is a natural monopoly. The key here is that a very large B implies
that each active broker gets a negligible share of the exchange’s pro…ts which is clearly less than its
contribution to total pro…ts. If those brokers have the decision power to set the exchange fee they
will want to set it as low as possible—that is, equal to average cost. Thus, we have shown that
there is a simple way of regulating exchanges optimally when they are natural monopolies: force
them to issue a lot of shares, but give the right to vote on the exchange fee only to active brokers.
4.3.2. Entry policy in a broker-owned exchange
We can now evaluate the entry policy of a broker-owned exchange. It is clear that shareholders
would like to block further entry when B is large: additional shareholders only dilute pro…ts and
reduce the dividends received by each current shareholder. But when the number of brokers is
small there are two additional e¤ects. On the one hand, additional brokers compete and reduce
brokerage pro…ts, which reinforces the pro…t-dilution e¤ect. But on the other, marginal brokerage
costs fall, volume increases and so do exchange pro…ts. The main result of this subsection is that
the pro…t-dilution e¤ect prevails and all brokers would like to block entry.

























where ¦E is the exchange’s pro…t. The …rst two terms are common to all broker members: on the
one hand, adding one member forces to divide the exchange’s pro…t among more members; but,
on the other hand, an additional member increases trading volume and the exchange’s rents (the
second term). The third term, which is clearly negative, is the fall in brokerage income caused by
26the fall in the commission pB due to the added competition brought about by additional entry. But
we can now prove the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Assume that the same broker who chooses pE also decides whether to accept new
members. Then, if ¦E(0) > 0 then all brokers in [0;B] would like to block entry.
Proof. The assumption that ¦E(0) > 0 implies that the interval [0;B]is large enough so that pE
chosen by b = 0 meets the exchange’s self-…nancing constraint in equilibrium.11 To sign (4.8), it is


















where we have used the derivatives obtained in Appendix B, which assume a …xed measure of







To prove the proposition we show that the derivative of d¼b
dB with respect to b is negative for all






































¢ , with ¢ = ¡[2+(1¡¿)K]. Moreover, using the derivatives































Since ¢ < 0 and
dpE
db > 0, the derivative will be negative if the sign of the expression within brackets
is positive. Recalling that equilibrium in the brokerage market implies that pB = ®b + ¯bx¤
b =
®B + ¯Bx¤
B, so that ¯bx¤
b = (®B ¡ ®b) + ¯Bx¤





















11It can be shown that when there are scale economies and B is su¢ciently small, then the exchange makes losses,
no matter how high pE is set. Hence, if B is too small, brokers must allow some entry until the self-…nancing constraint
is met.











b0 db0 ¡ B > 0, since
¯B
¯
b0 > 1 for all b 2 [0;B). Hence
d¼b
dB < 0 for all b 2 [0;B].
The incentive to block entry suggests a trade o¤: on the one hand, for a given B, a broker-
owned exchange sets a lower exchange fee because, contrary to an independent monopoly, all
brokers confront the marginal cost of brokerage. Nevertheless, an independent monopoly never
blocks entry, so that one may think that when B is su¢ciently small a broker-owned monopoly
may lead to higher exchange fees.
5. Competition between exchanges
A natural presumption that often emerges in policy discussions is that competition between ex-
changes should lead to e¢cient pricing. Even with scale economies, the argument goes, exploitation
of market power would prompt entry by another exchange and discipline the monopoly.
A general analysis of competition between exchanges would require us to distinguish between
alternative ownership structures and combinations of broker memberships; that is beyond the scope
of this paper. In this section we do two things. First, we analyze the particular but important
case of competition with integrated markets, showing that only with constant returns to scale
competition leads to e¢cient pricing of exchange services. Next, by means of examples, we show
that an exchange may use liquidity coupled with exclusive membership requirements as a barrier to
entry; and that even if entry by a rival is economically viable, fragmentation may be an equilibrium
outcome of competition.
It is useful to begin by de…ning some conditions that must hold in equilibrium when exchanges
compete. As before, we assume that brokers are price-takers and that each exchange chooses the
exchange fee. Thus, exchanges compete in fees, which seems a natural assumption.
Recall that if brokers b and b0 are involved in a transaction in exchange e as, respectively,
buyer and seller, then
pbu




Next note that if two brokers b and b0 are able to o¤er the …nal asset prices pbu
b and pbu
b0 , buyers
would be indi¤erent between trading with one or the other if and only if they obtain the same
utility from both: µ + ¿`se
b ¡ pbu





b = ¿ (`se
b0 ¡ `se
b ) (5.2)
As a consequence, any price di¤erential must be compensated by a proportional di¤erence in the
28liquidity o¤ered. If this condition is not met, all buyers would prefer to trade with the cheapest of










Alternatively, one can say that buyers are indi¤erent between pairs
¡
pbu;`se¢
if they lie in the same
line pbu = pbu
0 +¿`se, where pbu
0 is the competitive price associated to a 0-liquidity broker. Similarly,
sellers are indi¤erent between points in the line pse = pse




A case we will study below is when there are no dual brokers. Then the set of brokers do
not intersect across exchanges, the liquidities for buy and sell orders coincide and are the same for
all brokers within each exchange. Hence, liquidity becomes inseparable from the exchange, and
the notation `e has a clear meaning: `e ´ `se
b = `bu
b for all b 2 Be. Moreover, since within each
exchange brokers must be indi¤erent between processing buy or sell orders, and in view of the fact
that the way the exchange’s bill is split among buyer and seller is a matter of convention, (5.1) can
be written as pbu = 2pB + 2pE + pse
The indi¤erence conditions (5.2) and (5.3) must be satis…ed simultaneously by any exchange
that wishes to operate—in equilibrium, there can be no buy order without an associated sell order.
Therefore, it is possible to focus on spreads rather than bid and ask prices separately, in the
understanding that when spreads s ´ pbu ¡pse are competitive, bid and ask prices also are. To do
so, substract(5.3) from (5.2), which yields
sb0 ¡ sb = ¿(`se
b0 + `bu
b0 ) ¡ ¿(`se
b + `bu
b ):
If there are no dual brokers and b is member of exchange 1, then `se
b = `bu
b = `1, the same holds
for broker b0, and this expression is zero. Hence, one can speak generically about “exchange’s 1
spread”. It follows immediately that s2 ¡s1 = 2¿(`2 ¡`1). Hence, both exchanges are competitive
if and only if their spreads `e, e 2 f1;2g lie on the line
se = s0 + 2¿`e; (5.4)
where s0 is an spread that is competitive at a null level of liquidity ` = 0. Henceforth we shall
refer to equation (5.4) as the “Liquidity Adjusted Bid-Ask Spread” line (LABAS, for short), for it
is the collection of spreads that are indi¤erent for buyers and sellers to any other o¤er in the line.
As such, it allows comparisons of di¤erent liquidity-spread combinations: from an investor’s point
of view, those above the line are worse, those below are preferred. In the example at hand, we see
29that (s1;`1) and (s2;`2) are competitive o¤ers if they both satisfy (5.4):
s1 = s0 + 2¿`1
s2 = s0 + 2¿`2
)
) s2 ¡s1 = 2¿(`2 ¡ `1)
The LABAS line simpli…es the analysis of competition, for it reduces the dimension in which
competition occurs from two (liquidity and spread) to one (the 0-liquidity spread, i.e. the intercept
of the LABAS line). In particular, we can study competition of the Bertrand type by treating this
0-liquidity spread s0 as the analog of the price variable in conventional oligopoly models (see Vives
[2000]).
On the other hand, if liquidity has no value (that is, ¿ = 0), competition occurs only in
prices: lower spreads without any adjustment for liquidity are preferred by investors, regardless of
the volume traded in each particular exchange. In this case, the LABAS line is horizontal. This
is also what happens in an integrated market, since by de…nition, every broker o¤ers the same
liquidity, leaving spreads as the only variable for competing.
5.1. Competition in an integrated market
The following proposition establishes that brokers and exchanges must charge the same fees in
equilibrium in an integrated market.
Proposition 7. In an integrated market (i) all active brokers charge the same brokerage commis-
sion pB in equilibrium; (ii) all exchange where transactions take place charge the same fee pE.
Proof. In an integrated market `se
b = `bu
b = ` for all brokers b. It follows from the indi¤erence
conditions (5.2) and (5.3) that all brokers o¤er the same buy and sell prices, which implies that
pbu
b ¡ pse
b0 = s for all transactions. Therefore, in an integrated market all trades executed in an
exchange must have the same spread s in equilibrium. Now assume by way of contradiction that
exchange e charges an exchange fee that is higher than that charged by any other exchange. Then
brokers who trade in e must charge smaller commissions than brokers in other exchanges, otherwise
se > s. But since the market is integrated, there must be a positive measure of brokers who are
members of other exchanges, and they would prefer to settle trades in an exchange that charges a
lower exchange fee.
Note that this result holds regardless of the ownership structure of exchanges, as long as the market
is integrated. Next we show that when there are no restrictions to multiple memberships, one should
expect the market to become integrated.
Proposition 8. Every broker weakly prefers full membership.
30Proof. Consider broker b with membership Eb 2 2E such that `se
b · ` or `bu
b · `, and assume that
he executes some buy and sell trades. By joining all exchanges she can increase her liquidity to `
and the commission charged by ¿(`¡`se
b ) (to buyers) or by ¿(`¡`bu
b ) and still retain their clients.
Again, Proposition 8 does not depend on the ownership structures of exchanges; the proof
exploits the fact that all brokers gain individually by increasing their liquidity. This result is
important, because it implies that one should expect the market to become integrated if restrictions
to cross memberships are banned by the regulator.
We can now explore how competition depends on the exchanges’ cost functions. Let’s begin
with decreasing returns to scale in the exchange technology. Then we saw in section 3 that it is
optimal to integrate the market and set the exchange fee equal to marginal cost. The following
proposition shows that if exchanges act as price takers, the resulting Walrasian allocation would
implement the planner’s optimum.
Proposition 9. In an integrated market, the Walrasian equilibrium allocation is e¢cient.
Proof. The Walrasian equilibrium allocation is a feasible allocation that satis…es (i) pB = ®b+¯bxb;
since xb maximizes ¼b a.e. in B; (ii) 2pE = °+±ye, since ye maximizes ¼e for all e 2 E; (iii) Eye = 2`;
(iv) 2(pB +pE) = 1¡2`(1 ¡ ¿) (market clearing). These conditions correspond to equations (C.5)-
(C.9) that de…ne the Pareto-optimal allocation in the case of several exchanges.
Proposition 9 is important, because it shows again that the IO of stock exchanges is “simple”:
when the market is integrated, liquidity is not a cause of market failure. Instead, as in standard
markets, competition may fail to yield the e¢cient allocation when exchanges are natural monop-
olies or they are few in numbers. It it thus natural to analyze competition of the Bertrand kind,
where exchanges compete by setting pE.
To proceed, assume, as is customary in this model, that the lowest-fee exchange is forced
to serve all demand for transactions it faces.12 Also, as usual, assume that, in the case of a tie,
the market is split according to the “capacity sharing rule,” this is, the market shares that would
obtain if both competitors acted as price takers. Finally, for ease of exposition assume that there
are two identical and independent exchanges and that there is free entry into brokerage.
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of equilibria with increasing costs13. The solid line corresponds
to the pro…ts the exchange would obtain as a monopolist, when charging pE; the dotted line shows
the pro…ts the same exchange would obtain as a duopolist, when both exchanges charge pE and the
market is split in half. Note that both curves intersect to the left of pM
E : as pE falls away from pM
E ,
12See Vives (2000, ch. 5).
13See Vives (2000, ch.5) for an exposition and Dastidar (1995, 1997) for the formal analysis.
31duopoly pro…ts fall because two exchanges spread volume thus achieving lower total costs. If, as
in this case, both exchanges have the same convex cost structure, Proposition 5.1 in Vives (2001,
ch. 5) implies that the set of equilibrium fees is the set [p¡
E ;p+
E ] that satis…es ¼d(p+
E ) ¸ ¼m(p+
E ) and
¼d(p¡
E ) = 0—the thick segment in …gure 1. Fees higher than p+
E cannot be part of an equilibrium,
because an exchange would increase pro…ts by slightly undercutting, becoming a monopoly and
serving the whole market. Now it is known that the interval [p¡
E ;p+
E ] contains the Walrasian
allocation, but also prices that are higher can be sustained as an equilibrium. The reason is that
capacity constraints restrain undercutting. Hence, there is no guarantee that prices will be e¢cient.
More generally, the next proposition characterizes Bertrand competition in an integrated market
under increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale in the technology to execute trades.
Proposition 10. If the market is integrated and the technology to execute trades exhibits: (i)
increasing returns to scale (± = 0 and ¹ > 0), then only one exchange can survive in equilibrium;
(ii) constant returns to scale (± = ¹ = 0), then 2pE = ° in equilibrium; (iii) decreasing returns
to scale (± > 0 and ¹ = 0), then there are multiple equilibria, one of which is the Walrasian
equilibrium.
















This implicitly de…nes the equilibrium brokerage commission pB (`); an increasing and continuous
function of `. As a duopolist, each exchange obtains a pro…t of 2pEye¡(°ye+±
2y2
e). If both duopolists




Moreover, since demand is given by s = 1 ¡ 2`(1 ¡ ¿); an exchange fee of pE will produce a total
volume de…ned implicitly by 2[pB (2`)+pE] = 1¡2`(1 ¡ ¿), which holds i¤ `¤ = `(pE): In order to
determine whether a given pE is an equilibrium fee, we need to check whether there are incentives
for any duopolist to deviate. Higher prices will drive the duopolist out of the market, yielding a









































(ii) Follows immediately from (5.5) taking ± = ¹ = 0: its unique solution is 2pE = °. In
turn, (iii) follows from taking ± > 0 and ¹ = 0, case in which it is clear that ° + 1
4±` < ° + 3
4±`
for any ` 6= 0. Hence, the set of equilibrium fees is nonempty, non-degenerate, and contains the
Walrasian price 2pE = ° + ±` (from lemma 9). Finally, in the case (i) (± = 0 and ¹ > 0) there is
no solution to the system (5.5), for it requires simultaneously the price to cover the average cost
(2pE ¸ ° +
2¹
` ) and the pro…t to a monopolist to be lower than the pro…t to a duopolist (2pE · °).
The intuition is the usual one: there is no way that a duopolist would earn a pro…t while at the
same time restrain from cutting marginally its fee in order to drive its competitor out. The only
plausible situation is one in which there is only one exchange, for a monopolist always has higher
pro…ts than a duopolist: 2pE ¸ ° +
2¹
` ¸ °.
Proposition 10 tells us that competition leads necessarily to e¢ciency only if the technology
to execute trades exhibits constant returns to scale. Not surprisingly, integration and competition
are not feasible when exchanges are natural monopolies14. When returns are increasing or con-
stant, larger volumes do not increase the exchange’s unit cost. This yields the standard Bertrand
equilibrium when returns are constant, but implies that competition cannot occur with integration
and scale economies. On the other hand, decreasing returns to scale do not guarantee an e¢cient
allocation either, as there exist equilibria where exchanges price above marginal costs.
5.2. Liquidity and fragmentation as a barrier to entry
Proposition 8 established that every broker weakly prefers full membership. However, the example
that we are about to present shows that when liquidity matters, an exchange might have an incentive
to require exclusive membership from its brokers, banning them to trade in a rival exchange. By
doing so, it can appropriate the liquidity generated by the trade that takes place in it. This
liquidity, in turn, may su¢ce to preclude entry. In this way, liquidity and fragmentation can act
together as a barrier to entry, even when an entrant faces no cost disadvantage whatsoever.
In particular, assume that there are two exchanges: a monopolist (incumbent) and a potential
14If one changes the sharing rule in such a way that in case of a tie an exchange is selected randomly to serve the
whole market, then the unique Bertrand equilibrium is to set pE equal the least break even monopoly price. Then
the market is contestable (see Vives [2000, p. 119]). Nevertheless, such sharing rule looks very implausible to model
competition between exchanges.
33entrant. To keep it simple, assume further that the exchange technologies exhibit constant returns
to scale (average cost equals °), and that both exchanges are pro…t maximizers (independent
exchanges). The incumbent e = 1 confronts a perfectly elastic supply of identical brokers. As we
saw in section 4.2, in this case the monopolist charges
2pE = ° +2`(1 ¡ ¿):
Moreover, free entry with identical brokers implies that the marginal cost of brokerage is constant.
With a slight abuse of notation, call this constant marginal cost ®. It follows that in equilibrium
pB = ® and
s1 ´ 2pB + 2pE = 2® + ° + 2`(1 ¡ ¿):
Some tedious algebra shows that an unrestricted monopolist sets pE = 1
4 (1 + ° ¡ 2®), which implies
that ` =
1¡°¡2®
4(1¡¿) after noting that in equilibrium, s1 = 2pB + 2pE = 1
2(1 + ° + 2®) (see …gure 1).
Now consider an identical potential entrant (call it exchange e = 2), but assume that the
incumbent is successful in enforcing exclusive membership to all brokers who have already joined
him. Hence, if a broker is already a member of exchange 1, it cannot become member of exchange
2, and brokers who become members of exchange 2 are not accepted into exchange 1. Thus the
market is fragmented and whether investors trade with brokers who are members of exchange 2
depends not only on the di¤erences in spreads s2 ¡ s1, but also on their relative liquidities. Given
that upon entry liquidity in exchange 1 equals `, the LABAS curve is now s2 = s1 ¡ 2¿(`.¡`2).
s1 = 1
2(1 + ° + 2®)
The LABAS curve is depicted in …gure 2. In this particular case, it shows the combinations
of liquidity (`2) and spreads (s2) that leave investors indi¤erent between trading in exchange 1 or
2, given that exchange 1 o¤ers liquidity ` =
1¡°¡2®
4(1¡¿) and spread 1
2(1 + ° + 2®). It intercepts the
demand curve at the spread set by the incumbent monopolist: if the entrant could somehow o¤er
liquidity `, it could charge spread s1 an still leave investors indi¤erent. Yet when investors expect
to obtain less than liquidity ` in exchange 2, then s2 must be smaller than s1. In the extreme,




Can a potential entrant expect to make pro…ts? An interesting feature of fragmentation is
that it makes the pro…tability of the entrant depend on coordination between investors. One Nash
equilibrium of the simultaneous coordination game played by investors is that all investors move to
trade in exchange 2, which would make an o¤er of slightly less than s1 pro…table. Nevertheless, such
fast and costless coordination among investors (as opposed to brokers) does not seem to square with
34the common idea that liquidity is a property of each exchange, not easily transferred to others.15
If, as seems plausible, investors take as given the liquidity ` o¤ered by the incumbent exchange 1,
then any investor unilaterally deviating to trade through a broker who is member of exchange 2
expects her to provide liquidity `2 = 0. In that case it is pro…table for each investor to unilaterally
move to exchange 2 only if the spread is at most 1 ¡
1¡°¡2®
2(1¡¿) . But if ¿ > 1
2 (i.e. the preference of
liquidity by investors is “strong”),
1 ¡
1 ¡ ° ¡ 2®
2(1 ¡¿)
< ° + 2®;
and the exchange makes losses if it chooses to attract business. Therefore, in this case, liquidity
together with fragmentation enables the incumbent to erect a de facto barrier to entry, despite of
having no cost advantage. Note that in this example the entrant can draw on the pool of brokers
who did not become members of exchange 1. Since we have assumed that there are plenty of these,
exchange 2 faces no cost disadvantage.
Exclusivity and fragmentation are central in erecting the barrier to entry. To see this, con-
sider now an integrated market. Hence, upon entry all brokers who are members of exchange 1
automatically become members of exchange 2. Then regardless of the actual number of orders
executed in exchange 2, integration implies that every broker o¤ers liquidity ` (in other words,
the LABAS line is now horizontal at s1). Moreover, and this would probably be key in practice,
integration implies that coordination between investors is no longer needed: because brokers care
only about the exchange fee, investors get liquidity ` regardless with whom they choose to trade.
Thus, an entrant who o¤ers a spread of slightly less than s1 would attract all transactions. As we
saw in the previous subsection, both exchanges must then charge the same fee in equilibrium, and
in the only Nash equilibrium pE = °=2.
Similarly, note that when the preference for liquidity is not too strong (¿ · 1
2), then the
second exchange can make a pro…t even if it charges a spread of 1 ¡
1¡°¡2®
2(1¡¿) , and thus it would
enter if the incumbent exploits its monopoly power.
5.3. Fragmentation as an equilibrium outcome
The present example illustrates an extreme situation in which, by integrating, exchanges lose all
market power, driving pro…ts to zero. It is in their interest, then, to maintain fragmentation; this
is done by requiring exclusivity from their brokers.
As before, assume that there are two independent exchanges (e = 1;2), each with total costs
15For example, commenting on competition between exchanges in Europe, The Economist recently stated that
“Liquidity will thus be key in determining the winners and loosers in this battle of the bourses. [...] On this measure,
the LSE is still some way in front of its rivals.”
35of °ye. Also, assume that there is a mass ¹ of identical brokers in each exchange, where each
broker has a cost function of ¯x2=2 (it will become evident that it is in the exchanges interest to
limit entry into brokerage). If exchange e wants to process a mass of ye trades, it needs to assure
its brokers a brokerage commission of pB =
2ye
K : Note that a mass ye of trades only generates a
liquidity of `e = ye, since the market is fragmented.
>From section 5.1 we know that competition will occur in 0-liquidity spreads, fact that can
be represented by the LABAS line se = s0 + 2¿`e. Within this line, we are implicitly assuming
that there is a common liquidity-adjusted bid price pbu = pbu





dµ = 1 ¡ pbu
0
of buy orders, because only those traders whose valuations are such that µ+¿`¡pbu ¸ 0 are willing
to buy, that is, µ +¿` ¸ pbu
0 +¿`. A similar argument for sell orders leads to yse =
R 0
¡pse
0 dµ = pse
0 .
Adding both expressions, and using the fact that ybu = yse = y; we obtain ybu+yse = 1¡pbu
0 +pse
0 ,
so that y = 1¡s0
2 :
Given that both exchanges have the same cost structure, in the case of a tie they would split
the market in halves: y1 = y2 =
y




On the other hand, if one of them charges a smaller liquidity-adjusted spread, it would get the
whole market and, as a consequence, o¤er a total liquidity of `e = 1¡s0
2 :
Hence, the pro…ts to exchange e as a duopolist and as a monopolist are respectively:




































Solving for the set of Bertrand equilibrium 0-liquidity spreads (that is, the solution to the sys-













for the exchange fees. All
but the lowest equilibrium fee yield positive pro…ts for each exchange. Even though the exchanges’
own average costs are constant, they compete as if they had increasing costs because, by the exclu-
sive membership clause, the supply of brokerage services in each exchange is upward sloping. This
fact implies the existence of appropriable quasirents, softening price competition.
In the absence of exclusive membership requirements, by Proposition 8 all brokers would like
36to become members of both exchanges, for the e¤ect such membership would have on the liquidity
they can o¤er to their clients. As we already saw, Bertrand competition between exchanges would
then yield a unique equilibrium where 2pE = °, characterized by zero pro…ts for both exchanges.
Essentially, exclusive membership gave exchanges the ability to di¤erentiate products, on the
one hand, and on the other to build up quasirents by exploiting their broker-members’ decreasing
returns. Market integration destroys both. Thus, exclusive membership can be a device to soften
price competition which increases exchanges’ pro…ts. This certainly occurs at the expense of in-
vestors, brokers and e¢ciency, since Proposition 2 established that integration is a precondition for
e¢ciency. Investors are hurt by higher spreads and lower liquidity. Brokers are hurt because of a
lower volume and a smaller brokerage commission and quasirents.
6. Conclusion: liquidity and market structure
A central question driving this paper was: is liquidity (understood as a network externality) such
a key determinant of the industrial organization of the markets for transacting assets, that the
standard tools do not apply to them? We found that the answer is “it depends”: it depends on
whether the market is integrated or not. In an integrated market, the network of brokers is fully
connected, thereby giving complete reachability to any pair of potential traders. In this case,
the network externality becomes pecuniary, is internalized, and the organization of the industry is
“simple,” by which we mean that the standard tools of analysis carry over this industry as well. In
this way, an allocation is e¢cient if volume is generated at the least cost, and the optimal level of
volume is supplied.
In an integrated market the optimal number of exchanges depends only on the characteristics
of the technology to execute trades—whether it exhibits increasing, constant or decreasing returns
to scale. Such an allocation can be decentralized in a Walrasian equilibrium if technologies are
convex, that is, the …rst welfare theorem holds. In particular, liquidity is not a source of increasing
returns when the market is integrated. Arguably, a Walrasian equilibrium may not be the best
possible description of actual competition, particularly because exchanges are hardly price takers.
For instance, in a Bertrand equilibrium they may earn pro…ts even under decreasing returns to
scale. Yet, this is not a consequence of liquidity, as it is neither the fact that under increasing
returns to scale exchanges are natural monopolies.
In contrast, in a fragmented market competition is less intense as liquidity acts as a form of
product di¤erentiation. In addition, liquidity is underprovided, and the transactions are not carried
at the minimum possible cost in general. Thus, a fragmented market is necessarily ine¢cient.
Fragmentation may be endogenous as exchanges can build it by requiring exclusivity from
their broker-members. It helps exchanges to appropriate part of the value of liquidity implied in
37the volume of orders it processes, and part of any quasirents generated by brokers. As such, a
monopolist may use it as a barrier to entry. Or, a market may fail to become integrated in spite
of the incentives brokers have to act in their client’s interests. Thus, in the presence of liquidity, it
is possible that the market outcome fails to be e¢cient. This points in the direction of making of
integration a regulatory requirement.
Another question of interest in the context of stock exchanges is the optimality of their inter-
nal structure. An independent, pro…t-maximizing exchange behaves di¤erently than a members’
cooperative. Under decreasing returns to scale, the applicability of the …rst welfare theorem sug-
gests that on the grounds of e¢ciency there is no reason to prefer the form of a cooperative over
the independent exchange; on the contrary, internal con‡icts of interest may have the undesirable
consequence of breaking down pro…t maximization, leading perhaps to ine¢cient production.
Notably, when the technology to execute trades exhibits increasing returns to scale, and thus
pro…t-maximization does not lead to e¢ciency, the cooperative may be preferred. The con‡ict
of interest that arises from broker heterogeneity can be exploited in such a way as to make the
exchange choose voluntarily to price exchange services e¢ciently —which in this case corresponds
to average cost—. This is achieved by forcing membership to be as large as possible, while at
the same time letting only active brokers vote on pricing policies. Any price above average cost
implies a redistribution from active to inactive brokers, and will not obtain approval from such a
non-representative board.
Our results suggest in the end that regulators should trust the market mechanism even in
the presence of liquidity, but at the same time watch carefully membership policies and any other
policies that might challenge integration.
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A. Comparative statics of a brokerage equilibrium with free entry
















BdpB = 0; (A.2)









BdB = 0: (A.4)
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B. Comparative statics of a brokerage equilibrium with a …xed number of brokers
Equilibrium conditions are now
pB = ®b + ¯bx¤
b; (B.1)






Totally di¤erentiate (3.1)–(3.4) to obtain
dpB = ¯bdx¤
b; (B.4)



















































































































C. The social optimum
C.1. The planner chooses pE
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Now suppose ± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0. If 2pE = ° + ±`
E, then the constraint holds with slack, Á = 0, and marginal
cost pricing of exchange services is optimal. Next assume ± = 0 and ¹ > 0. Then the constraint binds and
average cost pricing of exchange services is optimal.
C.2. The planner chooses B, xb, and `






























¡ E¹ ¸ 0; (C.3)
f ¸ 0; (C.4)
where f is a fee charged to investors for using an exchange and constraint (C.3) is the equivalent of the
self-…nancing constraint in the previous problem—it says that .
Proposition 11. (i) If ± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0, then f = 0 and the optimal allocation is the same as when the
planner chooses only pE. (ii) If ± = 0 and ¹ > 0, then f =
¹
` and the optimal allocation is the same as when
the planner can only choose pE.
42Proof. Let ¸ be the multiplier associated with constraint (C.2), Á with (C.3) and ¾with (C.4). The …rst
order conditions of the problem are
@L
@`






















¡ ¸xB = 0; (C.7)
@L
@f










¾f = 0: (C.10)
Now it is apparent that when ¸ = pB, conditions (C.6) and (C.7) are equivalent to conditions (3.1) and (3.2)
which characterize the competitive equilibrium in the brokerage market (see Lemma 1). Hence, allocations
are equivalent if: (i) f = Á = 0 when ± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0; or (ii) f =
¹
` when ± = 0 and ¹ > 0; because then
(C.5) becomes equivalent to (3.3) as pE = ° + ±`
E in case (i) and pE = ° +
¹
` in case (ii), and (3.4) is satis…ed
as a constraint.
Now if ± ¸ 0 and ¹ = 0 then f` + ±`
2E ¡ E¹ = f` + ±`
2E ¸ 0 with f = 0. Hence, Á = 0, ¾ = 1 and
equation (C.5) reads






¡ 2¸ = 0:
Next, if ± = 0 and ¹ > 0 then f > 0. Hence ¾ = 0, Á = 1
`, constraint (C.3) holds with equality and f =
¹
`.
Then, equation (C.5) reads









¡ 2¸ = 0;
which is equivalent to (3.3), setting pE = ° + ±`
E and ¸ = pB.
D. Proof of Lemma 3





















43(if member b would choose to remain inactive, then x¤
b = 0 and
dpB
dpE does not a¤ect his decision). Now for
all pE, x¤
b ¸ x¤
b0 if b < b0, with strict inequality if x¤
b0 > 0. Therefore, if x¤
b0 > 0,
d¼b0
dpE > 0 when evaluated
at pE(b) and pE(b0) > pE(b). Moreover, since x¤
b0 > 0 by assumption, pI
E > pE(b0). hence x¤
b is decreasing in
[0;b0] and hence pE(b) is increasing in [0;b0]. On the other hand, if x¤
b = 0 given pE(b), then pE(b) = pI
E.






dpE < 0. It follows that broker BI would optimally chose pE(BI) < pI
E. Moreover, since the






BI(BI)]2 ¡ ´ > 0;
where, with a slight abuse of notation, pB(BI) denotes the equilibrium brokerage fee and x¤
BI(BI) the optimal




























b(b)]2 is decreasing in b Hence, there exists
b b such that [pB(b b) ¡ ®b b]x¤
b b(b b) ¡
¯b b
2 [x¤
b b(b b)]2 = ´ with pE(b b) < pI
E.




b(b)]2 < ´ for all b > b b. Hence for all b > b b,
x¤
b(b) = 0 and, pE(b) = pI
E.
E. Proof of Lemma 4
To prove part (i), consider a free–entry equilibrium where broker b is ensured a fraction ³ ´ 1
B of the





















Hence, if B > B(b), then brokers in (B(b);B] remain inactive and the equilibrium in brokerage is the same
as in a free-entry equilibrium.
To prove part (ii), note …rst that for B = B(b) the same argument as before applies. So consider
B < B(b)
Part (iii) follows just from a higher exchange fee discouraging entry into brokerage. Since pB(b) is
increasing in b, B(b) is decreasing in b for b · b b and equal to pI
E for b > b b. Similarly, part (iv) follows from
pE(b) = pI
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Liquidity and fragmentation
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